Arms
seized from insurgents in Quetta on August 13
Pakistan's
Future is Very Uncertain, But Don't Write it Off, says Cohen's
New Book
Special
SAT Report
WASHINGTON,
August 13: Pakistan’s future is very uncertain but it is
too early to write Pakistan’s epitaph, says noted South
Asian expert and writer Stephen P. Cohen in his latest book on
Pakistan, The Idea of Pakistan, to be released soon.
Many
observers have characterized Pakistan as a failed state, or even
a “rogue” state, particularly for its support of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan prior to the September 11th terrorist
attacks.
Armed
with nuclear weapons and sympathetic to separatist and radical
Islamist groups operating against arch-rival India, Pakistan is
also portrayed as hapless and on the verge of imminent catastrophe,
even as it commands a powerful military capability.
However,
as noted South Asian affairs expert Stephen Cohen argues, Pakistan’s
future is very uncertain. While Pakistan certainly confronts many
dangerous obstacles in the near future, Cohen believes that it
is too early to write Pakistan’s epitaph. Rather, he argues,
it is important to take a nuanced view of the issues surrounding
the idea of “state failure,” particularly before that
term is applied to Pakistan.
The
book examines the factors contributing to state failure and asks
whether the dual identities of Pakistan—created as a homeland
for Indian Muslims and as the world’s first modern “Islamic”
state—are viable in today’s world.
It
investigates Pakistan’s distinctive political and social
institutions, notably military rule, and sets out a range of possible
“futures” for what will soon become the world’s
fourth most populous state. Finally, Cohen scrutinizes evidence
indicating a reversal of the prevailing trend of decline in Pakistan,
and considers whether it is possible for this country to fulfill
its promise of joining the community of nations as a functioning
partner.
IANS
adds: The present system in Pakistan is likely
to continue, but certain events, trends and policies, including
a war with India and the growth of radical Islamic groups might
yet transform the country, says the book.
It also lists the possibilities of
Pakistan forfeiting American and even Chinese support, a series
of assassinations of senior Pakistani officials or revival of
ethnic and regional separatism.
Cohen, currently a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies
Program at the Brookings Institution, a Washington DC-based think
tank, discusses, among other things, the stability and durability
of Pakistan's present oligarchic-like order in the next five to
10 years.
"Conversely,"
it says, "one can hypothesize the normalization of relations
with India, the emergence of a benign and progressive leadership,
continuing American and international support, perhaps the success
of President (Pervez) Musharraf's version of guided democracy
and the emergence of Pakistani identity that did not rub up against
India, or other important states."
The
book notes that Pakistan's future will depend in large part on
its relations with its neighbors, especially India and Afghanistan.
The
conflict with India places the Pakistan army front and center
domestically and allows national security issues to cast a disproportionately
large shadow over Pakistan's economy, politics and society, it
says.
"Nevertheless, despite high
defence spending for years and two major wars, Pakistan is less
secure today than it was 55 years ago - and the same can be said
of India," it says.
It says "Pakistanis came to
view Indian society as the cause of their insecurity, thereby
implying war would be permanent and Indians always impossible
to trust".
"What both states have in common
is their ability to destroy each other, and neither has yet begun
to absorb the implications of how their new strategic relationship
matches up with their identity wars," it says.
The book refers to perceptive British
Pakistan-watcher Ian Talbot, who suggested that the analysis of
Pakistan goes beyond the cliché of three A's: Allah, Army,
and America.
Cohen argues that it is hard to escape
from the three A's with the army again in charge, America once
against Pakistan's chief patron, and the Islamists governing in
two provinces.
He, however, says Talbot is right
in his warning against predictions of the destruction or total
failure of Pakistan. This is a state that is not likely to disappear
soon.
Analyzing
the present army leadership, notably Musharraf, the book says
it will resist radical change in either foreign or domestic policy.
"Musharraf
is himself replaceable; he has little standing beyond his official
position as army chief and, were he to step down or be assassinated,
his army replacement would be an officer who represents the army's
wing of the establishment consensus, perhaps with modest movement
in one direction or another, and his civilian replacement as president
would likely to be the phlegmatic chairman of the Senate, Mohammedmian
Soomro," it says.
It contends Pakistan's army is strong
enough to prevent state failure, but not imaginative enough to
impose the changes that might transform the state.
The
book concludes that before writing Pakistan off as the hopelessly
failed state that its enemies believe it to be, Washington may
have one last opportunity to ensure that this troubled state will
not become America's biggest foreign policy problem in the last
half of this decade.
